Opscraft
AWS IAM & multi-account security · Lesson 5 of 7 · 3 min read

AWS Organizations and multi-account strategy

Why multiple accounts

Accounts are the strongest isolation boundary in AWS: blast radius, separate quotas, clear billing, distinct guardrails per environment, and simpler least privilege (prod account access is a different role entirely).

Typical structure (Control Tower / landing zone)

Enlarge diagramRootmanagement account: billing and Organizations onlySecurity OUlog-archive (immutable logs), security tooling (GuardDuty, Security Hub)Infrastructure OUnetwork (Transit Gateway, DNS), shared services (CI, ECR)Workloads OUProd OUorders-prod, payments-prodNonProd OUorders-dev, orders-stagingSandbox OUexperiments, budget-cappedSuspended OUclosed or quarantined accounts
Figure 1. A typical landing zone: organisational units group accounts by purpose, and guardrails are attached to the OUs.
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AWS Control Tower automates the landing zone: account factory, mandatory and optional controls (preventive SCPs, detective Config rules, proactive CloudFormation hooks), centralised logging, Identity Center integration. Account Factory for Terraform (AFT) provisions accounts via Terraform pipelines.

Service Control Policies

SCPs never grant permissions; they set the maximum. Common guardrails:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "DenyOutsideApprovedRegions",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "NotAction": ["iam:*", "organizations:*", "route53:*", "cloudfront:*", "sts:*", "support:*", "budgets:*"],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": { "StringNotEquals": { "aws:RequestedRegion": ["ap-south-1", "ap-southeast-1"] } }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ProtectSecurityTooling",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": ["cloudtrail:StopLogging", "cloudtrail:DeleteTrail", "guardduty:DeleteDetector", "config:StopConfigurationRecorder"],
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyLeavingOrg",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "organizations:LeaveOrganization",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

Other common ones: deny root user actions in member accounts, require IMDSv2 on ec2:RunInstances, deny unencrypted EBS/S3, deny creating IAM users/access keys, enforce tags on creation. Global services (IAM, Route 53, CloudFront) are exempted from region-deny with NotAction. Test SCPs in a sandbox OU first — a bad SCP can lock out every account.

SCPs don't affect the management account or service-linked roles; keep workloads out of the management account.

Enlarge diagramSCP on the Workloads OUdeny regions other than ap-south-1 · deny disabling CloudTrail or GuardDuty · require IMDSv2orders-prodeven its admins are limitedpayments-prodeven its admins are limitedorders-deveven its admins are limitedSCPs do not apply to the management account or service-linked roles.
Figure 2. SCPs never grant anything; they cut the maximum for every principal in the accounts below. Account admins cannot escape them.
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Identity Center (SSO)

Users/groups from an external IdP (Okta, Entra ID, Google) via SAML + SCIM; permission sets (policies + session duration) assigned to groups per account; users log in via the access portal or aws configure sso / aws sso login, and get short-lived role credentials. Break-glass access: a tightly controlled emergency role/user with alerts on use.

Enlarge diagramCompany IdPOkta, Entra ID,GoogleIdentity Centergroups ↔permission setsAccount + rolee.g. prod /ReadOnlyShort-livedcredentialsconsole or awssso loginThe IdP syncs users and groups (SCIM) and handles sign-in (SAML).
Figure 3. Identity Center: people sign in once with the company IdP and pick an account and role. Nobody needs IAM users.
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